By Lerato Mutlanyane
Hailing from Bloemfontein, the City of Roses, Palesa “Lisa S” Sentso is stepping into her own spotlight — and bringing a sound that refuses to be boxed in. First known as part of the duo Harmonic Squared, which made waves on the Bloem music scene in 2018, Lisa S has since evol...
... SIU recommends prosecution after R221m security contract scandal rocks municipality ... Mayor, Speaker, and Chief Whip Submit Resignations Following ANC PEC’s last year Resolution
Following months of investigation into financial misconduct involving more than R221 million — and mounting anticipation of a possible arrest — the Moqhaka Local Municipality has officially dismissed its Municipal Manager, Portia Tshabalala. Her removal was confirmed during a special council meeting held on 29 January 2026. Tshabalala was found guilty of financial misconduct linked to the unlawful payment of over R221 million to Isidingo Security Services, a KwaZulu-Natal-based company that allegedly did not qualify for the tender. She is also facing potential criminal charges after the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) reportedly completed its probe and submitted its report to the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) last year, recommending prosecution. Municipal spokesperson Dika Kheswa said council deemed the dismissal lawful and appropriate. “The municipality wishes to assure residents, employees and stakeholders that this transition will not disrupt service delivery,” said Kheswa, adding that council remains committed to upholding the rule of law and strengthening institutional integrity. In October 2025, Journal News reported that it was in possession of a confidential referral affidavit dated September 2025, containing the full SIU report and its recommendation for criminal prosecution. According to the report, Tshabalala unlawfully appointedidingo Security Services on 17 January 2020. The company allegedly failed to deliver the required armed security services, yet the municipality paid more than R221 million over three years for a contract originally valued at R87 million. The expenditure exceeded the original contract value by 66% — far above the 15% variation threshold permitted under the municipality’s 2018/2019 Supply Chain Management Policy. The SIU flagged multiple irregularities in the procurement and management of the contract. At the time of appointment, Isidingo’s firearm licence had reportedly expired, meaning it could not legally provide armed security services. As a Durban-based company, it also did not meet locality preference requirements. The report further identified a conflict of interest. On 17 October 2019, Tshabalala — then serving on the Bid Adjudication Committee (BAC) — recommended Isidingo as the preferred bidder. She later appointed the same company in 2020 while acting as Municipal Manager. Although she declared her prior involvement, the SIU found this constituted a conflict of interest under the Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000). Additionally, Tshabalala allegedly failed to obtain council approval for a contract extension that ran for more than nine months and continued renewing the agreement until 28 February 2023. Meanwhile, Free State MEC for Cooperative Governance, Traditional Affairs and Human Settlements, Saki Mokoena, has seconded T Ngesi as Acting Municipal Manager with effect from 10 February 2026. In a letter dated 9 February 2026, seen by this publication, Mokoena confirmed that the secondment will last for three months. “The MEC accedes to the request from Council to second an official to act as Municipal Manager… This is done to assist in stabilising and strengthening the administration of the municipality,” the letter states. Ngesi will be required to conclude a secondment agreement and performance agreement with the Executive Mayor to regulate the terms and conditions of his appointment. In a related development, Journal News has been reliably informed that Mayor Motloheloa Mokatsane, Speaker Selloane Khiba and Chief Whip Mamajeremane Semakale have recently resigned. The trio formed part of seven municipal troikas — comprising mayors, speakers and chief whips — dismissed by the ANC Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) in August last year, citing poor performance and failure to safeguard service delivery. However, ANC provincial spokesperson Thabo Meeko said he could neither confirm nor deny the municipal troika’s reported resignations when contacted on Thursday.
The Mahikeng High Court has suspended the Matlosana Local Municipality council’s decision to reinstate its dismissed Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Mercy Phetla. The ruling follows an urgent application brought before the court last week. Judge Andre Peterson ordered that the council resolution adopted on 4 February — which sought to reinstate Phetla — be set aside pending the final determination of the matter. The court further ruled that Phetla may not report for duty or perform any functions as CFO until the case is finalised. Journal News previously reported that Phetla faces two separate criminal cases involving allegations of corruption, fraud and money laundering. She is also the subject of a completed disciplinary process that resulted in a recommendation for her dismissal. Municipal spokesperson Kelebogile Moleko confirmed that Phetla’s dismissal letter has been issued. “The sanctions calling for the CFO, Ms Phetla’s dismissal, have been implemented in terms of the Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers in Local Government, specifically referencing Section 57A of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, which governs disciplinary procedures for senior officials,” said Moleko. The municipality further confirmed that a report compiled by Advocate S. Sethene, dated 30 December 2025, recommended Phetla’s dismissal. Earlier this year, a council sitting convened to deliberate on the disciplinary report descended into political tension. The meeting failed to proceed after ANC councillors walked out, resulting in a lack of quorum. The Democratic Alliance (DA) accused Executive Mayor and Speaker Stella Mondlane-Ngwenya of withholding the original disciplinary report from the council agenda. Mondlane-Ngwenya maintained that the postponement was necessary because the CFO was not present and legal representatives needed to present the findings. Speculation emerged that the walkout was intended to shield Phetla from accountability. The development drew attention given previous remarks by ANC provincial chairperson Nono Maloyi, who had stated that councillors must adhere strictly to constitutional and legislative processes in resolving municipal matters. Maloyi previously warned that any attempt to bypass due process could undermine local governance. According to the disciplinary findings, Phetla was charged with gross misconduct, dishonesty and dereliction of duty. Although she pleaded not guilty to five charges, she was found guilty on all counts. Among the findings was an unauthorised payment of R2.9 million to Variegated (Pty) Ltd for electrical materials that were reportedly never delivered. The report stated that the payment exceeded delegated authority limits. It was noted that a municipal manager may authorise expenditure up to R1.5 million, yet the payment of R2.9 million was approved. Phetla was also found responsible for irregular and wasteful expenditure amounting to R528 000. In addition, the inquiry found that she received gratification in the form of a Volkswagen Amarok valued at approximately R1.4 million from GMHM Construction and Projects, a municipal service provider. This was deemed to have brought the municipality into disrepute. Phetla has maintained that she purchased the vehicle herself; however, the disciplinary report indicated that no supporting evidence was provided. It has further been alleged that her bail was paid by the son of a director at GMHM. She has also been linked to other luxury vehicles, including a Porsche, Range Rover and Maserati. The Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) has obtained preservation orders on certain assets pending the outcome of legal proceedings. Phetla has denied ownership of the vehicles. The matter now remains before the courts, with the municipality’s decision to dismiss her standing pending final judicial determination.
Today marked one year since the election of the 11th Provincial Executive Committee of the ANC Youth League in the Free State on 12 February 2025. In the life of a liberation movement, a year is a short passage of time. In the life of an organisation in crisis, it is decisive.
This reflection does not substitute for the formal accounting that will be undertaken at Provincial Congress. It is a political assessment of the first year of leadership, the conditions we confronted, and the concrete direction we imposed upon the organisation. The central fact is this: the ANC Youth League in the Free State is more coherent, more disciplined, more intellectually grounded, and more interventionist than it was twelve months ago.
We inherited an organisation weakened by fragmentation, declining ideological depth, uneven discipline, and eroded confidence in constitutional authority. Structures functioned inconsistently. Branches were uneven in vitality. Political education had receded into occasional rhetoric. Internal contestation had displaced outward intervention.
Simultaneously, the socioeconomic conditions of the province had deteriorated to intolerable levels. Youth unemployment exceeded sixty percent. More than 442 000 young people were not in employment, education, or training. Over 11 000 graduates were unemployed. Economic growth stagnated below one percent. Infrastructure grants were under spent while communities endured collapsing water systems, deteriorating sanitation, impassable roads, and shrinking economic opportunity.
The Youth League confronted a dual responsibility: organisational reconstruction and economic intervention. We resolved that these tasks were inseparable.
On 30 June 2025, the ANC Youth League led a Provincial Youth March to the Office of the Premier. This was a deliberate act of mass political mobilisation, anchored in structured analysis and a comprehensive economic programme. We advanced a clear position: youth unemployment in the Free State constitutes a structural emergency demanding decisive state intervention.
We placed forward a detailed programme of action.
We called for the redirection of no less than R3 billion toward labour intensive infrastructure, youth cooperatives, and employment linked skills development. We advanced the establishment of a coordinated public employment authority with a defined target of creating 150 000 youth jobs by 2027. We proposed a multi billion rand industrialisation initiative focused on agro processing, manufacturing, and regional reconstruction in Botshabelo, QwaQwa, and Sasolburg. We demanded that at least 40 percent of provincial procurement be allocated to youth owned enterprises, supported by transparent reporting and measurable targets. We called for income support mechanisms for unemployed youth as an instrument of economic stabilisation and dignity.
These were not abstract proposals. They were fiscally grounded and institutionally implementable. To underscore readiness and seriousness, we submitted 30 000 CVs of unemployed youth from across all five regions of the province. We transformed the discourse from lamentation to organised capacity.
Beyond mobilisation, the PEC intervened directly in the architecture of governance. We asserted that youth development must be a central function of provincial administration. It cannot remain peripheral or confined to a single department.
We advanced the establishment of youth development directorates across all provincial departments, beginning with the Office of the Premier, to embed youth priorities in planning, budgeting, and procurement. We called for the institutionalisation of a Youth Advisory Panel with defined authority and direct access to executive decision making. We proposed the creation of a R1 billion Youth Development Fund with explicit redistributive orientation, prioritising young women, rural youth, and those structurally excluded from capital and markets.
We insisted that procurement set asides be treated as instruments of redistribution rather than procedural compliance. Public expenditure must be consciously directed toward youth enterprises, with transparent monitoring and political oversight.
In September 2025, the Provincial General Council convened in Koffiefontein marked a decisive ideological consolidation of this direction. The Declaration adopted there articulated an unapologetic programme of industrialisation, beneficiation, expansion of manufacturing capacity, redefinition of monetary policy to include employment, mobilisation of idle public resources for development, introduction of a universal income grant, and progressive taxation to confront extreme wealth concentration.
The PGC did not merely pass resolutions. It restored ideological seriousness. It reaffirmed that economic transformation is not an adjunct to political liberation but its material foundation. It re established the language of state intervention, redistribution, and productive reconstruction within the Youth League.
Internally, the PEC reasserted constitutional authority. Meetings regained regularity and substance. Communication across regions improved. Decisions of structures are implemented with greater consistency. Political education has been revived as a continuous and structured programme. Branch stabilisation is being pursued methodically, recognising that provincial strength is inseparable from grassroots vitality.
Discipline is applied with greater consistency. Accountability is no longer negotiable. Leadership is treated as collective responsibility rather than personal entitlement.
The qualitative shift is evident.
The ANC Youth League in the Free State now intervenes directly in economic discourse. It has articulated a coherent youth centred development agenda. It has re established structured engagement with provincial leadership. It has reconnected organisational work with the material struggles of unemployed youth, informal traders, rural communities, and graduates excluded from the labour market.
This does not mean that the crisis has been resolved. Youth unemployment remains devastating. Economic stagnation persists. Structural constraints endure. But the organisation is no longer adrift. It has direction. It has programme. It has coherence.
The organisation we inherited was uncertain and internally preoccupied. The organisation we lead today is outward facing, politically sharper, and organisationally firmer. It has marched. It has formulated policy. It has adopted binding resolutions. It has demanded institutional restructuring. It has re positioned itself as a serious political actor within the province.
One year is not a culmination. It is a foundation.
As Provincial Congress approaches, delegates will undertake a comprehensive evaluation of our stewardship. That is their constitutional right and duty. What can already be stated with clarity is that the 11th PEC has re established seriousness, restored ideological confidence, and placed the economic exclusion of youth at the centre of provincial political discourse.
The path ahead requires deeper consolidation, broader mobilisation, and firmer intervention. But the direction has been set. The Youth League in the Free State is no longer defined by drift. It is defined by conscious political movement.
In the Final Analysis
The structural contradictions of the provincial economy remain. Youth unemployment remains above 60 percent. Growth is insufficient to absorb labour. The reserve army of labour persists. These realities confront us without illusion.
What has changed is the internal condition of the movement.
The organisation is beginning to recover. Recovery does not mean the absence of weaknesses. It means that decay has been halted and reversal has begun. Discipline is being restored. Constitutional authority is being respected. Leadership is increasingly understood as responsibility, not entitlement.
We are beginning to reorient comrades around the twin tasks of the ANC Youth League.
The first task is to mobilise and rally the youth behind the banner and vision of the African National Congress. This requires ideological clarity, disciplined organisation, and sustained political education. It means building branches that are active in communities, embedding comrades among young people, and ensuring that the youth see the ANC not as a distant institution but as the political instrument of their liberation.
The second task is to champion the general interests and aspirations of the youth. This demands concrete intervention in the material conditions of young people: unemployment, access to land, education, industrial development, and economic inclusion. It requires policy engagement, oversight, organised campaigns, and a relentless focus on shifting the balance of forces in favour of the youth majority. Advocacy must translate into programme and measurable impact.
By that measure, the ANC Youth League in the Free State is stronger than it was twelve months ago. The organisation is recovering. Comrades are being reoriented around its historic mission.
The struggle continues,
Aluta Continua.
Sizwe Alhajra Zingitwa is a PEC member of the ANC Youth League Free State but writes in his personal capacity.
As President Cyril Ramaphosa prepares to deliver the State of the Nation Address (Sona) on Thursday evening, questions have arisen on why the Department of Land Reform did not implement the Land Reform Agency, which the president announced about five Sona's ago.
“Who is stalling the process? Was it (former minister of the Department of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development Thoko) Didiza or now (Department of Land Reform and Rural Development Minister Mzwanele) Nyontso, or are the bureaucrats that are ignoring the president's instruction,” asks Professor Johan Kirsten, the director of the Bureau for Economic Research (BER).
Delivering the State of the Nation Address in February 2021, Ramaphosa said: “During the course of the next financial year, we will establish a land and agrarian reform agency to fast-track land reform.”
In 2020, he said SA became the world’s second-largest exporter of citrus, with strong export growth in wine, maize, nuts, deciduous fruit and sugar cane. He noted that the favourable weather conditions in 2020 and the beginning of 2021 meant that agriculture was likely to grow in the near term.
This provided an opportunity for further public-private partnerships in agriculture to promote transformation and ensure sustainable growth.
The president said the success was an opportunity to accelerate land redistribution through a variety of instruments, such as land restitution and expropriation of land to boost agricultural output.
“To date, the government has redistributed over five million hectares (ha) of land, totalling around 5 500 farms, to more than 300 000 beneficiaries. This is in addition to the land restitution process, which has benefited over two million land claimants and resulted in the transfer of around 2,7 million ha.
“We are also pursuing programmes to assist smallholder and emerging farmers with market access, to develop skills across the entire agricultural value chain and increase the number of commercial black farmers,” Ramaphosa said at the time.
Why is the state still holding onto the 2.5 million ha of land they acquired through PLAS, asks Kirsten.
“This is an ideal opportunity to empower black farmers. Why is the land not transferred to them with title deeds? Why is there no consequence management?”
Despite over R52 billion being spent on land restitution, more than 5 700 land claims lodged before the original 1998 cut-off remain unresolved, with provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and Mpumalanga experiencing the heaviest backlogs, said Peter Setou, the chief executive of the Vumelana Advisory Fund, last month.
He said agricultural economists have identified that among the three elements of the land reform programmes identified in Section 25 of the Commission, redistribution of land experiences a higher rate than restitution of land and tenure of land.
“Reports show that 2.545 million hectares of land are held by the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy programmes. These must be transferred to qualifying black South Africans with title deeds. This process will facilitate and enhance access to finance for the new land owners and further promote an enabling environment for partnerships with the private sector.”
According to an article in "The Conversation" titled "How a land reform agency could break South Africa's land redistribution deadlock," agricultural economist Wandile Sihlobo and Kirsten proposed that establishing a Land Reform and Agricultural Development Agency could significantly accelerate land reform.
They argued this could happen if the current impediments ("arteries") to the process were removed.
Kirsten and Sihlobo wrote that in 1994, when South Africa became a democracy, white farmers owned 77.580 million hectares of farmland out of the total surface area of 122 million hectares. They said the new government set a target of redistributing 30% of the 77 million hectares within the first five years in government.
“This target has been consistently moved over the years, and now the aim is to reach 30% by 2030, in line with the National Development Plan’s agriculture and land reform objectives.
“Our estimates, which include restitution, redistribution, private transactions and state procurement, suggest that 13.2 million hectares (or 17%) have already been transferred from white landowners to the state.
"An additional 3.08 million hectares have been transferred to black owners and 10.135 million hectares through private and state-supported transactions, including land restitution.
“Adding 2.339 million hectares of land that was identified for restitution but for which communities elected to receive financial compensation as the means for restitution brings the total area of land rights that were restored since 1994 to 15.56 million hectares. This is equivalent to 20% of formerly white-owned land,” said Kirsten and Sihlobo in 2021.
South Africa has been elected to a two-year term on the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (Dirco) confirmed on Wednesday.
The term will run from April 1, 2026, until March 31, 2028.
The elections took place during the 38th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. South Africa will join the Kingdom of Lesotho to represent the Southern African region.
Dirco's Minister Ronald Lamola, who is leading the South African delegation, welcomed the election as an opportunity to advance peace and stability across the continent.
“To achieve the goals of Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want, we have to exert more efforts on peacemaking and peacebuilding in our Continent,” Lamola said.
South Africa pledged to work constructively with other members of the council to tackle ongoing peace and security challenges. These include unconstitutional changes of government, a trend that has persisted since 2020, as well as terrorism and violent extremism that have claimed thousands of civilian lives.
During its term, South Africa plans to prioritise peaceful conflict resolution, inclusive dialogue, and negotiations to help conflicting parties reach durable solutions.
The country’s approach aligns with its foreign policy, which emphasises Africa’s peace, stability, and development.
Dirco said South Africa is committed to contributing to a continent that is peaceful, prosperous, and embodies pan-African ideals, adding that the commitment is "evident in the numerous peace and security initiatives" the country has participated in, including its role as interim Chair of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
Geographical name changes are usually a topic of hot debate in South Africa, with pronunciation and heritage usually dominating the discourse.
Sport, Arts and Culture Minister Gayton McKenzie has approved 21 geographical name changes, including the official renaming of East London to KuGompo City, and Graaff-Reinet was recently renamed to Robert Sobukwe Town.
The changes are expected to be gazetted in the coming weeks.
But what people might not realise is that changing a city or town’s name in South Africa is a carefully regulated process and is designed to balance public opinion, heritage, and administrative consistency.
At the centre of this process is the South African Geographical Names Council (SAGNC), which is a statutory body tasked with advising the government on the naming and renaming of places across the country.
What is the role of the SAGNC?
The SAGNC was established under the South African Geographical Names Council Act 118 of 1998, and its mandate is to standardise place names and ensure they reflect South Africa’s rich cultural and linguistic diversity. It advises the Minister of Arts and Culture, who has the final say in approving name changes.
What is the process of the name change?
Proposals can come from municipalities, provincial governments, community organisations, or individual citizens, but are usually submitted through a local municipality.
The proposal must include the current name and the proposed new name, a detailed motivation for the change—covering historical, cultural, or linguistic reasons—supporting documentation such as evidence of historical usage or community consultation, and a plan for public engagement.
Once a proposal is submitted, public participation is mandatory.
This means that notices are published in the media, and community meetings may be held. Citizens can submit support or objections, which the SAGNC must carefully consider before making a recommendation.
The council then reviews each proposal to ensure it aligns with historical accuracy, cultural relevance, and linguistic correctness.
Additionally, they assess potential confusion or duplication with existing names. Once satisfied, the SAGNC forwards its recommendation to the Minister of Arts and Culture.
The Minister has the authority to approve or reject the proposal. If approved, the new name is published in the Government Gazette, making it official for all legal, administrative, and mapping purposes.
Following gazetting, municipalities and government departments update road signs, official documents, maps, and databases to reflect the change. Businesses and the public gradually adopt the new name, which may take months or even years to become fully established.
